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Abstract: Counterfeiting is a global phenomenon that poses a serious financial threat to the 
pharmaceutical industry and more importantly jeopardizes public safety and security.  Different 
measures, including new laws and regulations, have been put in place to mitigate the threat and 
tighten control in the pharmaceuticals supply chain.  However, it appears that the most promising 
countermeasure is track-and-trace technology such as electronic-pedigree (E-pedigree) with 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology.  In this study we present a framework 
exploring the antecedents and consequences of RFID applications in the pharmaceutical supply 
chain. The framework proposes that counterfeiting and E-pedigree regulation will drive the 
implementation of RFID in the pharmaceutical supply chain, which in turn provides strategic and 
operational benefits that enable competitive advantage.  Meanwhile, the implementation of RFID 
requires overcoming many operational, technical and financial challenges. The framework 
provides a springboard that future study can explore using empirical data. 
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1  Introduction 
According the World Health Organization (WHO), counterfeit drugs are defined as substandard 
pharmaceuticals which are mislabeled intentionally and fraudulently.  Counterfeit drugs may 
include products with the correct ingredients with false packaging and may involve the absence 
or insufficient amount of active ingredients (WHO, 2006). In essence, counterfeit drugs are 
pharmaceutical products that possess qualities below the established standards, which render 
them ineffective for treatment of diseases and could be potentially hazardous or fatal to patients.  
This spreading phenomenon involves both branded and generic products.  In the United States 
(U.S.), in 2004 the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) created a “National 
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Specified List of Susceptible Products” (NABP, 2004: see Exhibit 1 in the Appendix).  These 
drugs were designated and determined to be susceptible to adulteration, counterfeiting or 
diversion, and could potentially pose risks to the public health (NABP, 2004).  Counterfeiting is 
much more widespread and can involve many drugs from different therapeutic classes.  Drugs 
from different classes, regardless of their prices, have been counterfeited.  Expensive lifestyle 
and anti-cancer drugs, antihypertensive and lipid lowering agents, antibiotics as well as drugs for 
life-threatening diseases such as HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis or malaria in developing countries 
were reported to be counterfeited (WHO, 2006; NABP, 2004).  In addition, there have been 
reported cases of counterfeits of hormones, steroids and pain killers as well as inexpensive 
generic products.  However, for the most part, the combination of expensive drugs and the 
relative ease of access to the supply chain put the pharmaceutical industry and patients at high 
risk (NABP, 2004).  
 In 2006, Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS) Health identified four of the top ten 
leading branded drugs in sales volume as susceptible for counterfeiting by the NABP (IMS 
Health, 2007a; NABP, 2007).  The cholesterol-lowering medication Lipitor had the highest sales 
in 2006 and was also on the National Specified List of Susceptible Products.  To put the financial 
impact of counterfeiting in perspective, if Pfizer lost just one percent of Lipitor sales to 
counterfeiting it would cost them 136 million U.S. dollars, which is money that cannot be used to 
recoup the investment in the development of Lipitor and to develop new drugs.  Different 
measures, including new laws and regulations, have been put in place to mitigate the threat and 
tighten control on pharmaceuticals as they travel throughout the supply chain.  However, it 
appears that the most promising countermeasure is establishing track-and-trace technology such 
as electronic-pedigree (E-pedigree) with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology.   
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Radio frequency identification systems have been used in the manufacturing environment 
since the early 1990s as a way to control and track products moving on assembly lines, and the 
part bins that feed the line (Stall, 1993).  These early manufacturing implementations of RFID 
utilized proprietary systems that were internal to the organization.  As RFID technology around 
standardized open systems evolved and costs decreased, other RFID applications became 
feasible, drawing the interest of additional supply chain entities.  Industry mandates by Wal-Mart 
(O’Connor, 2005) and the U.S. Department of Defense (Collins, 2004a) provided the motivation 
to expand RFID systems beyond the factory walls to include suppliers, logistics providers and 
customers.   
Our discussion of RFID systems focuses on the use of passive, chip-based, read-write tags 
which provide a ‘living history’ of the item being tracked and therefore have the potential to 
increase the transparency of items moving through a manufacturing facility and the supply chain 
(Li and Visich, 2006).  However, this ‘living history’ is stored in a secure database, not on the 
chip as will be explained in the next paragraph.   
 In an RFID system a unique identifier, such as an EPC or an e-Pedigree, is embedded into the 
micro-chip in a tag.  The tag is then attached to the item being tracked.  As the item moves into 
the scanning range of the reader, the reader sends out electromagnetic waves that form a 
magnetic field when they ‘couple’ with the antenna on the RFID tag.  The tag draws power from 
the magnetic field and uses it to power the micro-chips’ circuits.  The micro-chip then modulates 
the signal received in accordance with its identification or programmed code and transmits or 
reflects a radio frequency signal.  The modulation is in turn picked up by the reader, which 
decodes the information contained in the transponder, and depending upon the reader 
configuration, either stores the information, acts upon it, or transmits the information to the host 
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computer via the communications port (Jones et al., 2004).  It is the database linked to the host 
computer that records and stores the history of the tagged item.  For a detailed discussion on how 
RFID systems operate see Dinning and Schuster, 2003; Jones et al., 2004; Srivastava, 2004; 
Angeles, 2005; or Li et al., 2006.  
Because RFID tags include tiny micro-chips that can store more information compared with 
bar-code technology, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considers RFID a more 
promising technology as a means to achieve e-pedigree (FDA, 2004).  E-pedigree systems 
depend on technology that would carry the serialized information to automatically identify each 
bottle or vial (Focinio, 2007) and RFID technology can be used to identify pharmaceuticals at the 
item level.  The Serial Number portion of the EPC on a 96-bit tag is reserved to identify the 
unique product item and it has the capacity to uniquely identify nearly 69 billion items for a 
single stock-keeping-unit (Brock, 2001).  In addition, RFID tags can provide real-time 
information with a capability of reading multiple items simultaneously with no direct line of 
sight to reader.  In contrast, bar codes have a limitation of reading one item at a time and the 
scanner has to be in a direct line of sight with the bar codes, which can be labor intensive 
(Wilding and Delgado, 2004).  
 RFID could provide benefits to all partners in the pharmaceutical supply chain, including 
manufacturers, distributors, retailers and hospitals.  Most importantly, patients and the public at 
large will benefit from this technology.  The use of RFID will improve the tracking of drugs as 
they travel downstream in the supply chain, improving product visibility thereby making it easier 
to detect counterfeiting and the malicious insertion of poisonous drugs by terrorists (Wicks et al., 
2006).  In addition, RFID could provide customer and patient security at the point of sale or 
dispensing.  According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 
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“electronic authentication at the dispensing level provides a direct means of determining in real-
time whether a particular packaging unit is authentic (PhRMA, 2005).” 
 Regardless of increased attentions to RFID and many proposed benefits of RFID 
implementation in the pharmaceutical supply chain, few studies have provided an integrated 
view of RFID implementation in the pharmaceutical industry.  To fill this gap, this study 
developed a framework exploring the antecedents and consequences of RFID applications in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain (see Figure 1).  This study provides a comprehensive evaluation of 
the potential and challenges of RFID and thus offers useful guidelines for pharmaceutical 
companies who are interested in adopting this technology.  Moreover, this study offers a 
framework that future study can explore. 
The paper is organized as follows.  We first present our framework.  Next, we discuss the 
drivers of RFID implementation in the pharmaceutical supply chain, followed by a discussion of 
various applications of RFID, associated benefits and the challenges of implementing RFID.  We 
end our paper with research implications and our concluding thoughts on RFID systems in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
2  Framework for RFID implementation in the pharmaceutical supply chain 
Figure 1 proposes that counterfeiting and E-pedigree regulation will drive the implementation of 
RFID in the pharmaceutical supply chain, which in turn provides strategic and operational 
benefits.  Strategic benefits include counterfeit prevention, recall precision, reimbursement 
compliance, and brand protection.  Operational benefits consist of ship and receive, labor and 
inventory, Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) compliance and loss prevention.  
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Meanwhile, the implementation of RFID requires overcoming many operational (tag positioning, 
liquid and biological tagging, read rate, and interference between wireless medical devices), 
technical (lack of standard for E-pedigree and inconsistent tag frequency), financial (cost of 
implementation) and other challenges (privacy concern).  We now discuss the drivers for RFID 
implementation in the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
 
2.1 Counterfeiting 
According to IMS Health (2007b), the global pharmaceutical sales market in 2006 was estimated 
to be U.S. $643 billion.  The WHO has estimated counterfeit drug sales as a percentage of total 
drug sales to be about 1% in industrialized nations and up to 10% in some developing countries, 
which is substantial and poses a threat to the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry.  It was 
also predicted that counterfeit drug sales would increase by 90% from 2005, reaching about $75 
billion globally in 2010 (WHO, 2006).  Though the prevalence of counterfeit drugs in the U.S. is 
unknown, it has become a growing problem.   
 In the U.S., the number of FDA counterfeit investigations has increased significantly over 
recent years.  The frequency of counterfeit investigations was 58 in 2004, an almost six-fold 
increase from 1997 (Lutter, 2005).  However, in 2005, the FDA’s Office of Criminal 
Investigations (OCI) initiated 32 counterfeit drug cases, a significant decrease from the year 
before.  This could be in part due to an increased awareness and vigilance at all levels of the drug 
distribution chain and due to increased coordination with other state and federal law-enforcement 
agencies and better communication with drug manufacturers (Lutter, 2005).  Or, due to the 
inability of regulatory agencies and the pharmaceutical supply chain to track and trace drugs, 
counterfeiters might be using new methods that are more difficult to detect. 
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According to Patton (2006), the global pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated.  
However, the rules as well as prices are different from one country to another, which tends to 
foster illegitimate business.  In the U.S., the wholesale pharmaceutical business is primarily 
controlled by three main wholesales: Cardinal Health, McKesson, and Amerisource Bergen, 
which have a market share of over 90%.  The rest of the market is shared by hundreds of 
wholesalers that serve as legitimate businesses in moving excess inventory from large 
distributors to the next customer in the supply chain.  These smaller businesses increase the 
complexity of the pharmaceutical supply chain which reduces visibility and creates an 
opportunity for counterfeiters to enter the supply chain (Patton, 2006).  In industrialized nations, 
internet-based sales pose a major threat to the pharmaceutical supply chain as they provide an 
easily procured source of counterfeits from different countries (WHO, 2006).  In the U.S., the 
illegal importation of drugs through internet sales from Canada or Mexico poses a threat to 
patients and the public who seek cheaper and unauthorized drugs with unknown origins.   
 
2.2 Government regulation and E-Pedigree 
In the U.S., the pharmaceutical supply chain stakeholders as well as U.S. state and federal 
officials have recently collaborated on establishing countermeasures to mitigate the risk of 
counterfeiting and tighten control on pharmaceuticals to increase security and protect the public.  
The most promising countermeasure is establishing track-and-trace technology such as 
electronic-pedigree (e-Pedigree) with RFID technology. 
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2.2.1 U.S Counter Drug Task Force  
Counterfeiting seems to be the greatest in regions or countries with weak legal and regulatory 
structure (WHO, 2006).  In the U.S., federal and state law enforcement agencies and in 
collaboration with all stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry are devoting more efforts and 
recourses to combat counterfeiting.  The U.S. Counter Drug Task Force has outlined 
countermeasures to protect the pharmaceutical supply chain such as the adoption and 
enforcement of strong laws and regulations, increasing criminal penalties to deter counterfeiting, 
securing business practices, implementing new technologies including “track and trace” and 
authentication of drugs in the supply chain, educating the public and health care professionals, 
and developing effective methods of reporting counterfeit pharmaceuticals (FDA, 2004).  
 
2.2.2  U.S. federal laws and the Prescription Drug Marketing Act 
On the federal level, the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA), as modified by the 
Prescription Drug Amendments of 1992, has mandated requirements that every drug must have a 
full pedigree.  A drug pedigree is a statement of origin, which provides the chain of custody of 
drugs as they are purchased, sold, or traded.  This was needed as a method of accounting for the 
origin of pharmaceuticals and a verification of legitimacy.  All involved parties names and 
addresses, and dates of transactions have to be identified and included for each sale of a drug.  
The main purpose of the PDMA is to tighten security and address problems of drug 
counterfeiting in the pharmaceutical supply chain (FDA, 1987; FDA, 1992).  In essence, the 
PDMA set the guidelines to ensure the safety and authenticity of drugs as they move throughout 
the pharmaceutical supply chain.  
  9 
 The PDMA and existing regulations do not require any particular technology for pedigrees 
such as bar-code, RFID or other technologies.  However, the FDA made a clear statement in its 
February, 2004 Combating Counterfeiting Drugs report that RFID represents one of the most 
important tools to help improve the safety of the drug supply chain (FDA, 2004).  Furthermore, 
the FDA had requested the pharmaceutical industry to pilot track-and-trace solutions based on 
RFID and related technologies such as mass serialization and electronic pedigrees (E-pedigree) 
by the end of 2007.  Mass serialization involves assigning an electronic product code (EPC) to 
each pallet, case, and individual package of drugs, thereby providing an E-pedigree that can be 
tracked from manufacturing to dispensing.  And, the FDA has set January 2010 as the deadline 
for the implementation of a pedigree system (Swedberg, 2008).  In addition, industry 
associations such as the Healthcare Distribution Management Association (HDMA) have 
published position statements advocating the accelerated adoption of electronic track and trace 
using EPC tagging.  Specifically, the HDMA advocated the adoption at the case level by the end 
of 2005 and at the selling unit level by 2007.  At the same time, RFID standards groups such as 
EPCglobal were exploring what standards and new practices need to be established to adopt 
electronic track-and-trace technologies throughout the supply chain (FDA, 2004).  More 
recently, EPCglobal ratified a new E-pedigree standard, which is designed to aid companies in 
complying with mass serialization and E-pedigree regulations (EPCglobal, 2007). 
 
2.2.3 U.S. state laws 
On the state level, stronger requirements to safeguard the drug supply chain have been adopted 
by some states such as Florida and California.  Florida has taken the lead by passing legislation 
that pharmaceutical product tracking and tracing should be embraced through the accumulation 
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of a paper-based product pedigree, detailing specifics about the supply chain history of each drug 
shipment.  In 2006, Florida expanded its requirement for paper-based pedigrees as a first step 
and subsequently established a system of E-pedigree verification utilizing electronic data 
interchange (EDI) (Koroneos, 2007).  Thus the system that has been established by Florida has 
been applicable to both paper-based and E-pedigree in the pharmaceutical supply chain.  More 
recently, Florida has pushed for an electronic signature and verification version for pedigrees 
(Farber, 2007).  In addition, California, Nevada and Virginia have also adopted laws to mandate 
some sort of pedigree for each drug sold in these states, which would require chain of custody 
from manufacturing to dispensing (Wasserman, 2005).  California enacted an E-pedigree law 
that would mandate pharmaceutical companies, wholesalers, and hospitals to use electronic 
traceability for pharmaceuticals by early 2009.  However, the law did not specify the use of 
RFID tags (Farber, 2007).  Wholesalers in California opted for the more advanced electronic 
product code information system (EPCIS), which relies on web based connections rather than a 
single point connection such as EDI (Koroneos, 2007).  Recently, due to industry pressure, the 
California State Board of Pharmacy decided to delay implementation of its E-pedigree 
requirement until 2011 (Swedberg, 2008).  In addition to these efforts, the NABP made some 
efforts to revise the Model Rules, in order to strengthen the requirements for wholesalers as well 
as establish stricter measures to ensure and protect the pharmaceutical supply chain (FDA, 
2004). 
 
2.2.4 European regulatory views 
Currently there are no regulations in the European Union (EU) requiring the use of e-pedigrees 
to track pharmaceuticals.  A 2005 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
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Associations report pronounced RFID as too expensive for item level drug tracking until at least 
2010, recommending 2D barcodes for mass serialization in the interim (Harrop, 2007).  The 
Italian government has proposed an initiative to require the use of dual bar coding (called 
bollino) to facilitate the reporting of sales data within 24 hours of any transaction along the 
supply chain.  The regulation is meeting resistance from the Italian pharmaceutical industry 
because the use of bollino would slow productivity since high-volume scanners have not yet 
been developed (Wasserman, 2005).  The lack of regulations and guidance from EU legislators 
means the European pharmaceutical industry will have to take the lead to reduce counterfeiting 
and protect the public safety.   
 
3  RFID implementation and benefits in the pharmaceutical industry 
Manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers have recently conducted pilot programs and undertaken 
major initiatives to evaluate benefits and the costs associated with RFID technology in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  Figure 2 shows the supply chain for drugs in the United States.  
Note that direct-to-consumer web sales from foreign based firms are not part of this supply 
chain. 
The potential benefits of adopting RFID technology to achieve e-pedigree in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain can be divided into strategic and operational benefits (see Table 1).  
For manufacturers, RFID technology could offer brand identity protection, reduce the risk of 
product tampering, decrease losses of theft and counterfeiting, and enhance product cycle 
information.  For wholesalers, there will be increased efficiency in managing logistics and 
inventory.  Retailers will increase patient confidence in their products, increase accuracy in their 
fill rate, and improve visibility and inventory management (Gebhart, 2007; Wicks et al, 2006; 
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Anonymous, 2004).  The following section will discuss RFID initiatives and corresponding 
benefits from manufacturers, distributors/wholesalers, drugstore and retailers, and hospitals and 
health care providers respectively. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
3.1  RFID initiatives from manufacturers  
Wal-Mart, which has a pharmacy division and has been the leader in implementing RFID, as 
well as the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) have ordered all their pharmaceutical suppliers to 
tag their products (Wasserman, 2005).  Major initiatives to deploy RFID technology began early 
by key players in the pharmaceutical industry such as Pfizer, Purdue, Merck, Novartis and 
AstraZeneca.   
 In early 2006, Pfizer began to place RFID tags on all units of Viagra (erectile dysfunction 
drug) sold in the U.S., including bottles, cases, and pallets.  The drug's popularity and high 
volume sales (over $1.68 billion & $850 million in 2004 and 2005, respectively) made it an 
attractive target of counterfeiters and therefore a prime opportunity for RFID-based counterfeit 
prevention (Wasserman, 2005; IMS Health, 2006).  Pfizer focused on EPC authentication as a 
mean of deterring counterfeiting, which is a system that is not a track-and-trace solution nor is an 
e-pedigree system. Companies such as Purdue, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck and Novartis as well as 
others are running pilot programs to tag individual drug items in order to detect dispensing errors 
and counterfeiting before reaching patients.  Purdue Pharma was one of the first in the industry 
to begin individual RFID tagging of Oxycontin (schedule II narcotic) bottles (Wasserman, 2005).  
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AstraZeneca also took a proactive approach to RFID by participating in the standards setting 
process, led through EPCglobal, and through the planned execution of a pilot in 2006.  The pilot 
study involved using both RFID tags and bar codes to provide serialization of individual items 
and cases to protect its widely sold drug Nexium from tampering and counterfeiting 
(Demetrakakes, 2005; Lewcock, 2007).  In 2006, GlaxoSmithKline attached RFID tags to all 
bottles of its HIV drug Trizivir (abacavir/lamivudine/zidovudine) distributed in the U.S. as part 
of a patient safety pilot project (Anonymous, 2006).  The company chose Trizivir for the pilot 
because it was listed on NABP's list of the most susceptible drugs to counterfeiting and diversion 
(see Exhibit 1 in the Appendix).  Many of the results of these pilot studies were shared with the 
FDA, but have not been shared publicly or published. 
  
3.2 RFID initiatives from distributors and wholesalers 
After drugs are manufactured and tagged, they are moved downstream to wholesalers and then to 
retailers’ distribution centers in pallets and cases (see Figure 2).  In turn, most of wholesalers or 
retailers distribution centers ship small quantities of different drugs to hospitals or retailers by 
bottles grouped in totes.  As required by state laws, distributors and wholesalers are required to 
provide some type of pedigree documenting the chain of custody, lot number and expiration date 
of each drug sold.  Cardinal Health, one of the largest U.S. wholesalers, recently concluded an 
RFID pilot program, which included tracking pharmaceuticals at all levels.  Their pilot program 
revealed that the technology read rate is very reliable at the item level. In their pilot, they utilized 
EPC Gen 2 UHF (Ultra High Frequency) tags to track pallets, cases and individual items, and 
they attained a read rate of more than 99% (Bacheldor, 2006).  Early in 2007, Cardinal Health 
announced it would integrate RFID technology into its pharmaceutical distribution center 
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operation at Sacramento, CA. by fall of 2007.  This is in preparation for California’s pedigree 
mandate that will require all drugs distributed in the state to be tracked and traced at each step 
throughout the supply chain (Cardinal Health, 2007).  Distributors have been trying to overcome 
some technical and business process issues (discussed later) before the widespread adoption and 
implementation of RFID.  
 
3.3 RFID initiatives from drug stores and retailers 
Retailers embarked on RFID technology in order to enhance compliance with the pedigree 
regulations.  In an early pilot study, dubbed Project Jumpstart, manufacturers including Abbott 
Laboratories, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and Procter & Gamble shipped bottles of RFID tagged 
pills to distributors McKesson Corp. and Cardinal Health who then shipped to CVS and Rite Aid  
retail pharmacies (Whiting, 2004).  The results showed that RFID could help satisfy both 
regulatory and retailer requirements, increase product security and consumer safety, enhance 
order accuracy and labor productivity as well as increase efficiency, and speed of recalls and 
returns.  These findings were based on shipping, tracking and tracing of nearly 13,500 packages 
of pharmaceuticals over an eight week time frame.  Thus, this project created the initial steps 
towards innovative approaches to address key issues such as mitigating the risk of counterfeiting 
and increasing supply chain visibility within each organization and across partners in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain to comply with the new regulations.  The group also worked with 
the FDA’s Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force to improve the pharmaceutical supply chain integrity, 
which is a high priority of the FDA.  Furthermore, HDMA and the National Association of Chain 
Drug Stores (NACDS) were involved with this effort and provided the rest of their members 
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with information and educational material based on the results .  However, these tests did not 
involve consumers (Anonymous, 2004). 
 
3.4 RFID initiatives from hospitals and health care providers 
In the healthcare system, there is an increasing interest in reducing the high rate of medical errors 
in order to improve patient safety through the utilization of RFID technology.  Additionally, 
RFID could be utilized for inventory control, asset management, as well as to capture and 
provide accurate data about patients including identification and movement.  Many hospitals use 
RFID to identify infants and match them with their parents (Ashar and Ferriter, 2007).  RFID 
could also be used for tracking and matching blood for transfusions, and combating the 
counterfeiting of medical products (Wicks et al., 2006).  More importantly, it is becoming part of 
electronic medical records, as information is stored on the RFID tag, which could accompany 
patients.  In a recent pilot study, RFID was utilized to ensure the quality, security and accuracy 
of prescribing and administering complex and critical drugs such as chemotherapeutic agents 
(Spahni et al., 2006).  Making use of all traceability data acquired from prescription to 
preparation to administration validate in real time that the right drug and dose are being given to 
the right patient at the right time, and can also record who handled the drug.  Furthermore, 
potential long-term applications of RFID are to capture data generated from medical devices 
such arterial blood pressure and other cardiac monitoring parameters and making them available 
as part of the electronic medical records (Ashar and Ferriter, 2007).  
 RFID was also tested by the U.S. Navy to track and provide information about wounded 
soldiers in the battlefield (Schwartz, 2004).  A similar system was also piloted in a hospital in an 
operational environment in Iraq, which resulted in the accurate documentation of casualties, 
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increased awareness of patient needs, and also maximized resources (Collins, 2004b).  This 
system can be applied to an emergency response system, where speed and accuracy of treatment 
are critical to the patient’s health (Wicks et al., 2006). 
 
4  Challenges with RFID adoption in the pharmaceutical supply chain 
Pharmaceutical companies are faced with many operational, technical and financial challenges in 
adopting RFID (see Figure 1). 
 
4.1 Operational challenges 
Companies are required to label not only pallets and cases but also each drug bottle to create a 
system that will allow for authentication.  It becomes even more challenging to decide where to 
position the RFID tag on the bottle in order to be read within a case or pallet. Additionally, 
tagging must be automated because of the huge volume of bottles that move through the 
packaging line.  There are also concerns about the speed and accuracy of electronic devices and 
systems.  Failure read rate can happen especially with vials made of metals and or containing 
liquids (Patton, 2006).  Tagging liquids and biological products will be even more challenging 
due to space issues on the exterior of bottles and vials and also due to the questionable effect of 
radio waves on these products.  Studies have shown that radio waves do not affect drugs in solid 
form, however, there are no studies published to date that look into the effect of radio waves 
from RFID tags on the stability and potency of liquids and biological products (Patton, 2006; 
Wasserman, 2005).  In hospitals, RFID technology has the potential to interfere with wireless 
communications of medical devices, especially if the same frequency is used (Ashar and Ferriter, 
2007).  In January of 2007 the FDA issued a draft guidance report on the design, development 
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and testing of radio frequency wireless technology in medical devices.  The focus of the report is 
to protect patients and operators from adverse effects caused by interference between wireless 
medical devices (FDA, 2007). 
 
4.2 Technical challenges 
Technical issues include the lack of consensus on standards for e-pedigree fields and formats, data 
systems, frequency and international transmission systems as well as software and hardware 
specifications (FDA, 2006).  However, in January of 2007, EPCglobal ratified the new e-
pedigree document standard, which should help companies to serialize products using EPC 
technology and thus comply with a wide variety of pedigree regulations.  Establishing e-pedigree 
standards should also resolve the interoperability issue of exchanging document-based pedigrees.  
Moreover, EPCglobal has started working on developing a full track and trace system based on 
the EPC Information Services (EPCIS) standard, allowing the information to be shared upstream 
and downstream in the pharmaceutical supply chain (Harrison, 2007).   
 Unlike the U.S. and Europe, where the EPCglobal is the standard, Asian countries, including 
China, use their own classification systems.  China supports the National Product Code (NPC), 
which is its own EPC-classification system for labeling products.  Japan also uses a different 
standard, which does not communicate with the standard set by EPCglobal.  Thus, 
standardization on a global level is still challenging and might take several years to overcome 
(Fish and Forrest, 2007).   
 Tag frequency is another technical issue that is not consistent worldwide.  Both Europe and 
the U.S. use UHF in the range from 868 MHz to 915 MHz, respectively, while Japan uses UHF 
for RFID at a higher frequency than 915 MHz (Fish and Forrest, 2007).  China has not accepted 
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UHF at these frequencies because they are designated for telecommunications, radio 
broadcasting and aerospace (Hotchkiss, 2005).  Instead, China’s Ministry of Information 
industries has approved bandwidth in the 840.25 to 844.75 MHz and 920.25 to 924.75 MHz 
ranges for passive tags (Swedberg, 2007).  These inconsistencies among different countries could 
increase the cost of implementation of RFID due to an increase in reader complexity and other 
hardware components to handle different frequencies.  
 
4.3 Financial challenges 
Though RFID technology can improve efficiency in the supply chain, cost becomes an issue, 
especially when tagging low cost items.  Therefore, it would be prudent to apply such technology 
to high priced drugs to reduce cost in relative terms.  Pfizer spent $5 million just to set up the 
tracking system for Viagra (Gebhart, 2007).  A study by HDMA demonstrated that the startup 
cost of RFID for large pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors would be $15-20 and $9-
20 million, respectively.  However, it was also estimated that on an annual basis pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and distributors would gain from $500 million to $1 billion and $200-400 million, 
respectively, with wide adoption of RFID technologies (Wasserman, 2005).  Tag costs are 
dropping and are highly dependent on volumes purchased and prices can vary from one country 
to another.  For example, passive tags in the U.S cost about 7 cents versus 10 cents in Europe and 
up to 30 cents in Asia (Fish and Forrest, 2007).  It is clear that more studies are needed to fully 
evaluate the business case for RFID, beyond the safety and compliance issues.  
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4.4 Other challenges 
Privacy and data sharing are major concerns, especially for patients.  Health care providers and 
pharmacists need to be aware of and be compliant with the U.S. Department of Human and 
Health Services Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to safeguard patients’ 
medical information (Wicks et al., 2006).  The American Civil Liberties Union and Consumers 
Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN) have raised concerns over 
tracking patients’ medications and invading their privacy through the use of RFID in the retail 
setting (EPIC, 2007).  Currently this is not an issue at the retail level because RFID tags are 
placed on large bottles that retailers buy and not on the individual containers that are dispensed 
to customers (FDA, 2006).  Additionally, security measures can be applied to the RFID tags to 
prevent the accessibility of confidential patient information (Wicks et al., 2006).  
 There are also major concerns about the ownership of the confidentiality of the business 
transaction data as it travels through the supply chain.  It is critical for partners in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain to able to share information in order to ensure a successful 
transmission of e-pedigree throughout the supply chain (Forcinio, 2007).  Moreover, it is the 
consensus of the FDA that it is essential for each partner in the supply chain to have access to the 
pedigree information, starting from the original manufacturer.  The FDA also wants pedigree 
access in order to monitor suspicious or illegal activity (FDA, 2006).  
 
5  Research limitations, implications and future research 
This review of RFID and the pharmaceutical supply chain provides a comprehensive evaluation 
of the potential of RFID among all stakeholders in the supply chain.  It provides practitioners 
information about RFID technology, and its utilization and potential benefits in the 
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pharmaceutical supply chain and healthcare system.  Additionally, it increases the level of 
awareness about the issues facing the pharmaceutical supply chain such as: the scope of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals and the importance of increased vigilance and tighter control on 
pharmaceuticals as they travel throughout the supply chain; the legal and regulatory mandates; 
and the implementation challenges with RFID technology, including the technical, security and 
privacy hurdles.  We attempted to present a balanced and comprehensive view of the issues.  
However, we had to rely primarily on non-peer reviewed literature due to the lack of peer 
reviewed publications related to this topic, which could have confounded our conclusions and 
presented some biases towards RFID.  And, most RFID pilot study results were shared privately 
with stakeholders and were not made available to the public, especially the cost-benefit analysis.  
Beyond the mandates, it is clear that more controlled studies are needed to fully examine the 
cost-benefit ratio and the return on investment of RFID at all levels in the pharmaceutical supply 
chain.  It is also crucial for the results of studies to be shared with all stakeholders, including the 
public. 
 We provide a framework (see Figure 1) that future study can use to create a conceptual 
model and theoretical propositions that can be investigated using field research and empirical 
data.  This model could also posit how implementation of RFID might lead to competitive 
advantage.  Another study could investigate how RFID can mitigate the risks to the 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  Research could also focus on the level of implementation and how 
the benefits change as RFID is deployed.  We hypothesize that the benefits of RFID will increase 
as RFID is implemented at more points along the pharmaceutical supply chain shown in Figure 
2.  And, that the greatest benefits will occur when RFID is deployed in the entire supply network.  
Such studies can deepen our understanding of RFID adoption in the pharmaceutical supply chain 
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and offer empirical justification for the benefits and challenges discussed in the non-peer 
reviewed literature. 
  
6  Conclusion 
The safety and security of the pharmaceutical supply chain hinges on the visibility and 
accountability of the drugs as they travel downstream in the supply chain.  Compliance with 
PDMA is essential and the supply chain will have to capitalize on the advances of electronic 
track-and-trace based on RFID, as it appears to be the most promising technology to create e-
pedigree.  However, RFID technology is still emerging and the pharmaceutical supply chain 
needs to overcome the associated challenges to fully realize the wide range of benefits associated 
with the implementation of RFID, beyond the mandates.  It is also critical to conduct more 
studies to justify the business case for RFID, since RFID technology provides an opportunity to 
improve supply chain efficiency and more importantly, public safety.   
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Figure 1. RFID Implementation in the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
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Figure 2  Diagram of the Flow of Drugs in Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
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Table 1.  Strategic and Operational Benefits of RFID and e-Pedigree 
 
 Manufacturers Distributors/ 
Wholesalers 
Retailers Hospitals Public 
Strategic 
Counterfeit 
Prevention 
Prevention of 
tainted raw 
materials 
Prevention of 
tainted bulk 
containers 
Prevention of 
tainted bottles 
Prevention of 
tainted 
bottles/vials 
Increased 
awareness and 
safety measures 
Recall 
Precision 
Track and trace 
raw materials from 
receiving to 
distributor and 
drugs from 
distributors  
Track & trace 
drugs from 
manufactures to 
retailers and 
back 
Track and trace 
drugs from 
distributors to 
patients and 
back  
Track and trace 
drugs from 
distributors to 
patients and 
back 
Increased 
safety by 
alerting 
patients of 
tainted drugs 
Reimbursement 
Compliance 
N/A N/A Increased 
accuracy of 
reimbursements 
and decreased 
paperwork & 
errors 
Increased 
accuracy of 
reimbursements 
and decreased 
paperwork & 
errors 
Increased 
accuracy of 
reimbursements 
and decreased 
paperwork & 
errors  
Brand 
Protection 
Protects brand 
image, safety, 
reputation & 
profitability 
Promotes safety  Promotes 
Safety and 
increases 
consumer 
confidence 
Promotes 
Safety and 
increases 
consumer 
confidence 
Promotes 
Safety and 
increases 
Consumer 
confidence  
Operational 
Ship & Receive Provides faster and 
accurate shipping 
& receiving 
Provides faster 
and accurate 
shipping & 
receiving 
Increased 
accuracy of fill 
rate and reduce 
medication 
errors 
Increased 
accuracy of fill 
rate and reduce 
medication 
errors 
Increased 
safety and 
decrease 
adverse events 
Labor & 
Inventory  
Decreased costs of 
labor and 
inventory 
Decreased costs 
of labor and 
inventory 
Decreased 
costs of labor 
and inventory 
Decreased 
costs of labor 
and inventory 
Decreased 
prices 
PDMA 
Compliance 
Increased 
compliance 
Increased 
compliance 
Increased 
compliance 
Increased 
compliance 
Increased 
safety 
Loss 
Prevention 
Increased security 
of raw materials, 
work-in-process 
and finished goods 
in storage 
Increased 
security as 
product is 
transported 
downstream and 
is stored in the 
warehouse 
Increased 
security against 
employee theft 
and customer 
shoplifting 
Increased 
security against 
employee theft 
Decreased 
prices  
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Appendix 
Exhibit 1. The National Specified List of Susceptible Products (NABP, 2004) 
 
1. Combivir® (lamivudine/zidovudine) 
2. Crixivan® (indinavir) 
3. Diflucan® (fluconazole) 
4. Epivir® (lamivudine) 
5. Epogen® (epoetin alfa) 
6. Gamimune® (globulin, immune) 
7. Gammagard® (globulin, immune) 
8. Immune globulin 
9. Lamisil® (terbinafine) 
10. Lipitor® (atorvastatin) 
11. Lupron® (leuprolide) 
12. Neupogen® (filgrastim) 
13. Nutropin AQ® (somatropin, E-coli derived) 
14. Panglobulin® (globulin, immune) 
15. Procrit® (epoetin alfa) 
16. Retrovir® (zidovudine) 
17. Risperdal® (risperidone) 
18. Rocephin® (ceftriaxone) 
19. Serostim® (somatropin, mannalian derived) 
20. Sustiva® (efavirenz) 
21. Trizivir® (abacavir/lamivudine/zidovudine) 
22. Venoglobulin® (globulin, immune) 
23. Viagra® (sildenafil) 
24. Videx® (didanosine) 
25. Viracept® (nelfinavir) 
26. Viramune® (nevirapine) 
27. Zerit® (stavudine) 
28. Ziagen® (abacavir) 
29. Zocor® (simvastatin) 
30. Zofran® (ondansetron) 
31. Zoladex® (goserelin) 
32. Zyprexa® (olanzapine) 
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